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INTRODUCTION 
“[I]t’s the wave of the future,” stated Washoe County District Attorney 
Christopher Hicks.1 He was referring to Nevada Assembly Bill 193 (“AB 193”), 
passed during the 2015 legislative session. The bill allows admission of hearsay 
evidence in preliminary hearings and before grand juries for cases involving (1) 
sexual abuse against a child under sixteen, (2) child abuse of a minor under six-
teen, and (3) domestic violence that results in substantial bodily harm.2 Thirty-
six other states have passed similar bills.3 Additionally, although rare, hearsay 
evidence is permissible in federal court.4 Advocates for domestic violence survi-
vors support this bill because abuse survivors are typically reluctant to testify 
against their abusers.5 By allowing hearsay evidence, AB 193 would enable oth-
ers, such as police officers or district attorneys, to describe events that occurred 
and repeat words that were said, sparing the victim from having to testify.6 
                                                        
*  Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2017, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas. This note was made possible by magnanimous contributions of love, time, support, 
and devotion from my wife, Melissa. I owe not only the completion and publication of this 
note to her, but my entire ability to attend law school. Any success I had there is due to her 
living a lonely life whilst attending to all things needed to maintain a happy, healthy household 
during the last four years. Despite my work all day, school all night schedule, her job as wife, 
mother, friend, chauffer, tutor, chef, trainer, tailor, and event planner was by far the harder 
job. 
1  Terri Russell, Hearsay Rules Would Change Under AB193, KOLO8 NEWS NOW (Apr. 2, 
2015, 8:14 PM), http://www.kolotv.com/home/headlines/Hearsay-Rules-Change-Under-AB1 
93-298536091.html [https://perma.cc/98S9-JHS5]. 
2  A.B. 193, 78th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT 
§§ 171.196(6), 172.135(2) (2015)). 
3  See Hearing on A.B. 193 Before the Nev. Assemb. Judiciary Comm., 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. 
20 (Nev. 2015) (testimony of Steven Wolfson, Clark County District Attorney) (Mar. 13, 
2015). 
4  FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 amendment. Particularly, the Ad-
visory Committee Notes to the 1972 addition make clear “that a finding of probable cause may 
be based on ‘hearsay evidence in whole or in part.’ ”. Id. 
5  Editorial, Domestic Violence Bill Doesn’t Serve Justice, L.V. REV.-J. (Apr. 30, 2015, 7:44 
AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/opinion/editorial-domestic-violence-bill-doesn-t-serve-
justice [https://perma.cc/W7LR-8XTN]. 
6  Russell, supra note 1. 
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The abuse survivor’s reluctance to testify is a significant bar to the successful 
prosecution of domestic violence. Numerous factors cause this reluctance: cul-
tural or familial pressure, worry about loss of financial support from the abuser, 
fear of losing custody of children, and an ongoing or renewed romantic relation-
ship with the abuser.7 Apart from these reasons, AB 193 focuses on the survivor’s 
fear of facing their abuser in a court proceeding. Facing their abuser again, even 
in a court setting, often traumatizes victims, causing them to relive the abuse.8 
Simultaneously, seeing the survivor relive the fear of the abuse can re-empower 
the abuser, fueling the abuser’s drive for more power and control, and put the 
abuse survivor at a higher risk of murder.9 
Despite the bill’s passage with large majorities in both houses of the legisla-
ture, there was significant opposition.10 “The right to confrontation is a bedrock 
principle of the criminal justice system,” wrote Alameda County Public De-
fender Brendon D. Woods.11 In his letter opposing the bill, Mr. Woods noted that 
AB 193 significantly erodes the accused’s constitutional right to confrontation.12 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him.”13 Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has strengthened the 
defendant’s position vis-à-vis the Confrontation Clause, making it harder to in-
clude hearsay statements into evidence.14 Bills like AB 193 have been an imme-
diate response by many states to help prosecute domestic violence abusers.15 Un-
fortunately, this legislation is the wrong response. It will do little to help 
survivors of abuse, and what little good it does will be at the expense of the rights 
of the accused. 
While the goals of AB 193 are laudable, the bill focuses on the wrong prob-
lem, falls short of true effectiveness, and infringes upon the constitutional rights 
of the accused. This note attempts to chart a path that both vindicates victims’ 
rights and maintains judicial fairness for the accused. But first, to know where 
                                                        
7  Michelle Byers, Note, What Are the Odds: Applying the Doctrine of Chances to Domestic-
Violence Prosecutions in Massachusetts, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 551, 557 (2012). 
8  See Lindsay Hoopes, Note, The Right to a Fair Trial and the Confrontation Clause: Over-
ruling Crawford to Rebalance the U.S. Criminal Justice Equilibrium, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 305, 313 (2009). 
9  See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v. Bed-
ingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 
145 (2010). 
10  See, e.g., Letter from Brendon D. Woods, Alameda Cty. Pub. Def. (Mar. 11, 2015), 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/78th2015/ExhibitDocument/OpenExhibitDocu
ment?exhibitId=13054&fileDownloadName=Opposition%20Letter_Brendon%20Woods% 
20Public%20Defender%20Alameda%20County.pdf [https://perma.cc/C53B-LHCQ]. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
14  See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. 1865 (2012). 
15  Hearing on A.B. 193 Before the Nev. Assemb. Judiciary Comm., supra note 3. 
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that path leads, it is well to know where the path began. Part I will present a brief 
overview of the origins of hearsay and confrontation, and a discussion of their 
doctrinal development in pre-revolution America. Particular emphasis is placed 
on how the constitutional right of confrontation relates to the other rights con-
tained in the Sixth Amendment. Part II will trace the Supreme Court’s treatment 
of hearsay as it relates to confrontation. This review of cases will show the de-
velopment of working rules used by the Court today, and explain how these rules 
vary from hearsay’s and confrontation’s historical roots. Finally, Part III will re-
view recent cases under the most recent Supreme Court rules on hearsay and 
confrontation, and outline some troubling trends from those cases. This final Part 
will also explain how AB 193 falls short of its intended purpose by describing 
how the bill’s shortcomings create a significant cost that outweighs any benefit. 
The Conclusion provides suggestions for a better solution. 
I.   ORIGINS OF HEARSAY AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
A.   Hearsay 
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines hearsay as “testimony that is given by a wit-
ness who relates not what he or she knows personally, but what others have said, 
and that is therefore dependent on the credibility of someone other than the wit-
ness.”16 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is generally not admissi-
ble, unless an exception applies.17 Common exceptions to the hearsay rule re-
volve around the physical and mental state of the declarant, the availability of 
the declarant, and the declarant’s credibility.18 The Nevada rule against hearsay 
mirrors closely the federal rule.19 But the rules against hearsay have not always 
been what they are today. 
 Hearsay’s common law origins followed developments in witness testi-
mony.20 In the early 1400s, witness testimony before a jury was practically un-
recognizable from what it is today. A typical witness was a pre-appointed indi-
vidual (“transaction-witnesses”), who often did not testify live in court.21 
Additionally, such witnesses were not the only source of information on which 
the jury based its final determination. Rather, litigating parties had a right to per-
sonally inform the jury, either before trial or after they were empaneled.22 Fur-
ther, nothing prevented a juror from making any extra-judicial inquiry, including 
interviewing witnesses who were not going to testify at trial.23 As Sir John For-
tescue, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench of England, commented in 1450, “If 
                                                        
16  Hearsay, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
17  FED. R. EVID. 802. 
18  FED. R. EVID. 803(3), 804, 806. 
19  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 51.065, 51.069, 51.105, 51.315 (2015). 
20  See John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 438 (1904). 
21  Id. at 440. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. at 440–41. 
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the jurors come to a man [outside of court] . . . to have knowledge of the truth of 
the matter . . . it is justifiable.”24 In short, witnesses were paid professionals, 
parties were permitted ex-parte contact with jurors, and jurors had permission to 
consult any source of information. 
 These practices changed over the next one-hundred years as trial by jury 
grew in practice and prominence. Independent jury investigation diminished, 
creating a large dependency on live, in-court testimony.25 By the mid-1500s, the 
increased dependence on live, in-court testimony generated questions and dis-
cussion about the “sufficiency in quantity and quality” of witnesses.26 Here is 
when hearsay was first seriously questioned. 
 Initial hearsay concerns were more a question of quantity than of quality.27 
It was generally accepted that having only one sole witness, who based his entire 
testimony on hearsay, was insufficient evidence.28 The harder question: Must 
testimony from second or third witnesses derive from personal knowledge, or 
could their testimony be based on hearsay as well?29 At first, as long as the hear-
say testimony corroborated the personal knowledge testimony, it was admissi-
ble.30 However, this reliance on corroboration led to some of the most infamous 
abuses of hearsay. 
 Sir Walter Raleigh was a poet, soldier, politician, and explorer.31 He was 
instrumental in establishing early American colonies, and today is widely re-
membered for his extravagant tales of searching for El Dorado in South Amer-
ica.32 Shortly after the ascension of James I to the English monarchy, Raleigh 
was accused of conspiring against the new king.33 On trial for treason, with his 
life in the balance, the strongest evidence presented against Raleigh was a signed 
confession of Baron Cobham, who admitted his own guilt while also naming 
fellow conspirators.34 Raleigh objected, arguing, “[L]et Cobham be here, let him 
speak it. Call my accuser before my face.”35 Lord Chief Justice Popham denied 
                                                        
24  Id. at 440 (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT 
THE COMMON LAW 128 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898)). 
25  Id. at 441. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  See id. at 442. 
29  See id. at 442–43. 
30  Id. at 443. 
31  See Agnes M.C. Latham, Sir Walter Raleigh, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.brita 
nnica.com/biography/Walter-Raleigh-English-explorer [https://perma.cc/4YVD-B2B7] (last 
updated Dec. 11, 2015). 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004). 
35  Id. (quoting The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in 2 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF 
STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON 16 (1809)). 
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this request, simply replying, when “so many circumstances agree[] and con-
firm[] the accusation . . . the accuser is not to be produced.”36 In other words, 
corroboration trumped confrontation. 
 Other prominent abuses occurred during this time as well. The English mon-
arch established the Court of the Star Chamber to alleviate the case load of both 
civil and equity courts.37 To facilitate public trials, the court’s frequent practice 
was to examine witnesses in secret.38 It was not long, however, before these se-
cret proceedings began to be used as a political weapon—threatening and har-
assing those out of favor with the crown.39 The ex-parte, anonymous testimony 
obtained by the Star Chamber was then used to “trap the accused into a confes-
sion.”40 
 These abuses did not go unnoticed. By the mid-1600s, mounting concern 
developed into working hearsay rules, which functioned under two scenarios: (1) 
whether the statement was a general statement (made out of court), or (2) whether 
it was made in court under oath.41 Concerns regarding statements made out of 
court mounted because they offered “the other side hath no opportunity of a 
cross-examination.”42 Questions of validity and reliability (e.g., corroboration) 
were becoming secondary to the concern of confrontation. But this was a slow 
process.43 Sufficient corroboration of personal knowledge testimony through 
hearsay testimony still frequently overcame objections to confrontation.44 State-
ments under oath were similarly concerned with and justified by sufficient cor-
roboration.45 
But, evolving concurrently with hearsay rules was another feature that is 
common in today’s law practice—assistance of counsel. Principally, counsel was 
at first only required for a defendant in capital and felony cases.46 This changed 
during the eighteenth century, as assistance of counsel became available for even 
petty crimes and misdemeanors.47 During this transition, the growing and fre-
quent use of counsel was instrumental in converting the judicial process into the 
                                                        
36  Wigmore, supra note 20, at 443 (citing 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 427 (1875)). 
37  Court of Star Chamber, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Cou 
rt-of-Star-Chamber [https://perma.cc/N2F5-ETK7] (last updated Oct. 24, 2003). 
38  Edward P. Cheyney, The Court of Star Chamber, 18 AM. HIST. REV. 727, 738 (1913). 
39  See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Pro-
posal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 570–71 (1992). 
40  Id. at 570. 
41  Wigmore, supra note 20, at 448. 
42  Id. at 448 (referencing 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 431 
(1716)). 
43  See id. at 453–54. 
44  See id. at 446–47. 
45  Id. at 448. 
46  See, e.g., Patrick S. Metze, Speaking Truth to Power: The Obligation of the Courts to En-
force the Right to Counsel at Trial, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 163, 168–69 (2012). 
47  Id. at 168. 
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adversarial system.48 With the growing establishment of the adversarial system, 
the right to cross-examine became a more permanent part of judicial proceedings, 
and a bedrock principle of justice.49 
Corroboration and cross-examination, therefore, formed the core historical 
concerns regarding hearsay. It was in this historical setting that Blackstone pub-
lished his famous commentaries. Before Blackstone, corroboration had been a 
numerical question—inquiring how many hearsay witnesses plus personal-
knowledge witnesses equaled admissible evidence.50 Blackstone, however, fo-
cused instead on reliability exceptions.51 Many of these exceptions described by 
Blackstone are recognized today, including excited utterances, dying declara-
tions, and self-inculpatory statements, to name just a few.52 
Regarding cross-examination, Blackstone notes that “[a]ny one giving evi-
dence may state what he has seen . . . but he may not state what he has heard said 
. . . [unless there be] the opportunity of contradicting them.”53 In other words, 
hearsay of any kind required cross-examination, unless it fell in one of the ex-
ceptions noted above. More intriguing than this hard stance on hearsay is that it 
is discussed not in a chapter on evidence, but in reference to juries.54 Blackstone 
praises the use of juries as “the principal safeguard of people’s liberties” because 
“open examination of a witness in viva voce . . . is much more conducive to the 
clearing up of truth.”55 
By tying so closely together a jury trial, cross-examination, and the adver-
sarial process, his conclusion that discovering the truth through confronting ad-
verse witnesses “can never be had upon any other method of trial” is made with-
out justification; it is simply axiomatic.56 Blackstone practically elevates 
confrontation into a natural right. As this note will show, this focal switch on 
hearsay from corroboration to reliability, coupled with the growing acceptance 
of the adversarial process, had a significant impact on the interpretation of hear-
say and the Confrontation Clause for the Founding Fathers. 
                                                        
48  Id. at 199 n.272 (citing Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942)). 
49  See id. at 208–09. 
50  Wigmore, supra note 20, at 442. 
51  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 796 (Banks & Broth-
ers 1877) (noting the preference to not admit discourse evidence, “but the man himself must 
be produced.” Additionally, when courts do admit hearsay evidence, “such evidence will not 
be received of any particular facts” due to the inherit unreliability. Exceptions for written rec-
ords and dying declarations are then later discussed). 
52  See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804. 
53  JOHN E. EARDLEY-WILMOT, AN ABRIDGMENT OF BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 312 (3d ed. 1855). 
54  See Berger, supra note 39, at 583. 
55  Id. at 583–84 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 
*345). 
56  Id. at 583 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 
*345). 
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B.   Right to Confrontation 
 Blackstone’s treatment of hearsay had a particular impact on the American 
colonies. In fact, it was under the influence of this treatment that the Framers 
drafted the Confrontation Clause. The scholarly literature, however, is still in 
debate about the specific origins of the Confrontation Clause.57 Early colonial 
records are largely silent regarding this right, and other common sources used to 
ascertain the Framers’ perspective (e.g., Federalist papers, Notes on the Consti-
tutional Convention) also yield little to no information.58 Because of this murki-
ness, the literature is divided largely into two academic camps regarding the 
origin of the Confrontation Clause: (1) either it arose as a result of the political 
abuse suffered in the English court system (e.g., Raleigh, Star Chamber), or (2) 
it was an institutionalization of colonial criminal procedure.59 
 Certainly, Raleigh’s trial and the Star Chamber were not far removed in time 
and place from colonial life.60 But more present than these past abuses were re-
cent judicial usurpations, such as the Stamp Act and other custom laws. These 
acted as fresh, daily reminders that the harms of Raleigh’s trial were real.61 The 
Stamp Act was a 1765 parliamentary decree that required an official stamp on 
all legal documents to effect their validity.62 The Stamp Act expanded the role of 
the vice-admiralty courts, allowing them to proceed without a jury and to exam-
ine witnesses in secret.63 As revolutionary fervor built in the colonies, Parliament 
also decreed that all traitors to the crown should be tried in England, effectively 
depriving colonists of a jury of their peers and destroying their ability to call 
witnesses on their behalf.64 In post-Glorious Revolution England, these two traits 
(jury trial and witnesses) became bedrock principles of judicial procedure, guar-
anteed to all citizens (or at least those in England).65 Denial of these rights, cou-
                                                        
57  See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative 
History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77 (1995). 
58  See id. 
59  See id. at 81–82. 
60  Raleigh was tried in 1603. Wigmore, supra note 20, at 443. The Star Chamber was in 
operation from the fifteenth century through the mid-seventeenth century, until its dissolution 
in 1641 by the Long Parliament. Court of Star Chamber, supra note 37. 
61  Berger, supra note 39, at 578–79. 
62  Stamp Act, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/american-revolution/stamp-act 
[https://perma.cc/ZE5R-KEKK] (last visited Jan. 27, 2017). 
63  See Berger, supra note 39, at 579. 
64  Id. 
65  See id. at 577. 
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pled with the mounting pressure from the Stamp Act and other similar laws, be-
came especially hard on the colonists.66 At best, the colonists considered these 
acts as backward steps; at worst, they were inquisitorial and tyrannical.67 
 Also during this time, colonial law practices began to distinguish themselves 
from their common law heritage. In particular, the importance of juries and of 
the right to counsel took hold much faster in the colonies than it had in England.68 
An ardent fear of monarchical control-inspired actions to ensure fair judicial 
practices and strong criminal rights.69 The rights of free men were afforded to the 
accused, and only deprived after a determination of guilt.70 In order to protect 
these rights, the colonial trial system quickly developed into the adversarial sys-
tem, leaning heavily upon a full right to counsel, with a focus on defense by 
cross-examination.71 
 As noted, Blackstone had a particular impact on colonial lawyers, who de-
voured his Commentaries, taking to heart his praise of juries, and the inherent tie 
between jury trial and live cross-examination.72 Indeed, George Mason’s draft of 
the Confrontation Clause for the 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights read as if it came 
straight from Blackstone.73 Virginia was the first state to incorporate a Confron-
tation Clause in its legislation, becoming a model for at least seven other states, 
and eventually for the United States Constitution.74 
 The location of the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment also looks 
back to Blackstone. The right to confrontation is included with the rights to jury 
trial, calling of witnesses, and assistance of counsel.75 All of these rights, taken 
as a bundle, support the arguments of either academic camp regarding the origin 
of the Confrontation Clause. These rights, together, act as a powerful restraint 
                                                        
66  Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1115 (1994) (noting that by the 1760s 
“Americans attached a unique constitutional importance to jury trial” in light of “increasingly 
violent colonial political dissent.”). 
67  See Jonakait, supra note 57, at 86 (noting the dominance of judges over trials, particularly 
over the jury). 
68  In the roughly 150-year span from the first American colonies in the early seventeenth 
century to the revolutionary era in the mid-eighteenth century, colonial law accepted the legal 
precedents that took hundreds of years to develop under English common law. William B. 
Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 393, 393–94 (1968). Regarding the importance of juries, see note accompanying Moglen, 
supra note 66. Regarding the importance of right to counsel, see Jonakait, supra note 57, at 
92–96 (noting that while the right to counsel in England expanded greatly in the 1730’s, sig-
nificant expansion of the right in American colonies began as early as 1660, showing that 
“Americans were willing to fashion their own criminal procedure to be more protective of the 
accused than the common law or English practice was.”). 
69  Jonakait, supra note 57, at 114. 
70  See id. 
71  Id. at 116. 
72  See Berger, supra note 39, at 581 n.102, 581–83. 
73  See id. at 584–85. 
74  Id. 
75  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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against excessive and oppressive governmental power, and they form the core of 
the then-in-practice colonial criminal procedure. As such, it is impossible to cre-
ate an original understanding of the Confrontation Clause without considering it 
in conjunction with the other Sixth Amendment rights. Just as hearsay in its 
origin became inextricably combined with the notions of corroboration and 
cross-examination, so, too, did the American constitutional right to confronta-
tion, as it became inextricably bound to notions of jury trial, cross-examination, 
and assistance of counsel. 
II.   COURT TREATMENT OF HEARSAY AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
A.   The Early Cases (Natural Right) 
Unfortunately, there is little early court interpretation of hearsay and con-
frontation. The two notions share similar origins, focus on similar concerns, and 
therefore have close historical ties. But it is misleading to think that confrontation 
always concerns hearsay, or that hearsay always requires confrontation. The two 
developed independently and have distinct aims. 
The most prominent early exposition occurred in the 1807 trial of Aaron 
Burr. Burr, after his failed nomination to the vice-presidency, and the subsequent 
duel with Alexander Hamilton, fled west.76 There, he found supporters who of-
fered him funds, land, and young men willing to follow him.77 But to what end? 
Burr’s intentions were uncertain; an expedition against the Spanish into Mexico 
was as plausible as a conspiracy against the United States.78 Fearing the latter, 
General Wilkinson, a former confidant of Burr, became worried of further threats 
against the still-fledgling nation, and informed President Jefferson of Burr’s mi-
litia.79 Labeling Burr a traitor, Jefferson issued a warrant for his arrest.80 
Burr’s trial ended in acquittal,81 but more important than the holding were 
the words of Chief Justice John Marshall regarding hearsay and confrontation. 
During Burr’s trial, the prosecution sought to present an out-of-court statement 
from an absent witness as a declaration by a co-conspirator.82 Chief Justice Mar-
shall, however, struck the statement on confrontation grounds.83 He pondered 
why the Confrontation Clause was a constitutional provision at all if mere verbal 
                                                        
76  CHARLES F. HOBSON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AARON BURR TREASON TRIAL 1–2 (2006). 
77  Id. at 2. 
78  See id at 2–3. 
79  Id. at 3. 
80  See Donald F. Paine, Proof of Treason: The Trial of Aaron Burr, TENN. B.J., July 2003, at 
24. 
81  Aaron Burr Arrested for Treason, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-histor 
y/aaron-burr-arrested-for-treason [https://perma.cc/VRQ4-SPEC] (last visited Jan. 27, 2017). 
82  United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14694). 
83  Id. 
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declarations made in absentia could be availing in court.84 Perhaps a little dra-
matically, the Chief Justice finished that train of thought by concluding that if it 
were so, then all of “life, liberty and property, might be more endangered.”85 
While this dramatic flourish at least suggests the importance of confrontation 
to Marshall, unfortunately his opinion gives no further justification as to why this 
was inadmissible hearsay and why the Confrontation Clause comes out on top. 
At a minimum, the bare takeaway here is an early judicial disdain for ex-parte 
testimony, and a preference for confrontation by cross-examination. 
The few state court decisions that followed Burr’s trial agreed with Marshall. 
A North Carolina court denied admittance of an absent witness’s deposition re-
garding what an alleged horse thief had done with the stolen animal.86 The North 
Carolina court stated, “[F]ounded on natural justice, [] no man shall be preju-
diced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine.”87 Like the 
Marshall opinion in the Burr trial, this holding lacks specific and detailed justi-
fication. Nowhere in the opinion does it state that confrontation is based on the 
unreliability of hearsay, or on a need to safeguard any procedural practice that 
existed in early America. Instead, the Confrontation Clause, “founded on natural 
justice,” is treated like a fundamental right.88 
Similarly, an appeal before a Tennessee court went so far as to deny testi-
mony received in the lower court because the witness had died and was therefore 
unavailable for cross-examination.89 Prior testimony of a deceased witness was 
an exception noted by Blackstone.90 However, this Tennessee court noted, 
though “frequent deaths may take place . . . it would be dangerous to liberty to 
admit such evidence.”91 Again, the opinion lacks further reasoning; it simply as-
serts that confrontation is required. 
These and other early cases share the colonial-era concern that confrontation 
allows for effective advocacy of the accused.92 The fear of another King George 
inspired early Americans to hold tight to their constitutional rights, especially 
those rights that restrained governmental power, such as those found in the Sixth 
                                                        
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 103–04 (1794). 
87  Id. at 104. 
88  Id. 
89  State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 229, 229 (1807). 
90  BLACKSTONE, supra note 51. 
91  Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) at 229. 
92  See Jonakait, supra note 57, at 124. 
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Amendment.93 Effective defendant advocacy was one way to limit government 
overreach and to retain power in the people.94 
Any of a number of existing legal or historical explanations suggest the 
source for judicial interpretation of the Confrontation Clause: fear of a return to 
monarchical control, an adherence to existing criminal procedure, a disdain for 
ex-parte testimony, a sincere belief that confrontation is a natural or fundamental 
right. Any or all—or perhaps even none—of these reasons account for the his-
torical source for judicial interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. 
B.   Working Towards a Rule (State Deference) 
 It may be likely that these early cases, so close in time to the ratification of 
the Bill of Rights, were somehow just more in touch with the Framers’ intent, 
that further explanation was therefore unnecessary. Regardless, court decisions 
regarding hearsay and confrontation read this way for close to ninety years.95 
When the court addressed this issue again, the justices discovered a new inter-
pretation that led confrontation into new territories. 
In the 1895 case Mattox v. United States, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld a murder conviction, stating that a deceased’s prior testimony was not 
hearsay, and that such an exception had existed long before the Constitution.96 
While this holding is similar to those in previous cases, the dissent in Mattox 
began to ask questions. In dissent, Justice Shiras was convinced that sufficient 
facts showed the dead witness was not reliable.97 Recognizing that the prior tes-
timony of a dead witness was a traditional common law exception to hearsay, 
Justice Shiras noted that this was not a universal rule and that the facts justified 
a departure from that rule.98 
Raised by this dissent was the question left unanswered by this and the prior 
court decisions: What is the justification for confrontation? Is it simply the in-
corporation of the common law? If not, then what other purpose did the Framers 
have in mind? Unfortunately, it would be many years before the Court would 
again take up this line of questioning and attempt an answer. 
                                                        
93  Id. at 100 n.110. “Power was feared in the eighteenth century, whether it was governmental 
power, royal power, aristocratic power, or ‘mobocracy.’ The very existence of power, rather 
than its abuse, raised concern. All authority was dangerous, but not all power was illegitimate. 
Only authority checked by procedural rules was ‘lawful.’ ”Id. (quoting JOHN PHILLIP REID, 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 50 
(1986)). 
94  Id. at 112 (noting that “the driving force behind the Bill of Rights,” including the Sixth 
Amendment’s protections, was “to protect against federal encroachments”). 
95  See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895). 
96  See id. at 238, 240–44. 
97  See id. at 251 (Shiras, J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant offered two witnesses to 
show that prior testimony of a deceased witness, whose testimony was crucial for the convic-
tion, “was given under duress, and was untrue in essential particulars”). 
98  Id. at 252, 258–59. 
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The first attempt to answer these questions came in the 1970 case of Dutton 
v. Evans.99 Defendant Evans, along with a conspirator, Williams, was tried and 
convicted of murder.100 Crucial evidence for Evans’s conviction came from a 
man named Shaw, who had been incarcerated with Williams.101 Shaw testified 
to statements Williams made when they were incarcerated together.102 The state-
ments inculpated Evans.103 Traditional common law allowed a hearsay exception 
for co-conspirator statements if they were made during the conspiracy.104 Here, 
the trial court permitted the hearsay under a state statutory exception, which al-
lowed any declaration by any of the conspirators at any time to be admitted, as 
long as the conspiracy had been proven.105 Evans argued that that state statute 
did not conform to federal court exceptions and therefore was a violation of his 
right to confrontation.106 
The case divided the court. A plurality held that the state statutory expansion 
of hearsay exceptions was not a violation of confrontation, but a permissible ex-
ercise of the state’s rulemaking power respecting the law of evidence.107 This 
holding is intriguing for several reasons. 
First, it makes clear that the common law is not the guide to interpreting the 
Confrontation Clause. Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, stated, “[T]he 
Confrontation Clause is . . . [not] a codification of the rules of hearsay and their 
exceptions as they existed historically at common law.”108 Second, there is nei-
ther reference to the disdain of ex-parte communications nor appeal to a natural 
right as shown in earlier cases.109 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan noted, “[T]he 
historical understanding of the clause furnishes no solid guide to adjudication.”110 
Finally, procedural history indicates that the lower courts in this case emphasized 
the rights of the accused, but here, the Court’s opinion focused on deference to 
states in drafting their hearsay laws. Again, Justice Stewart explained, “The issue 
before us is . . . whether a defendant’s constitutional right ‘to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him’ is necessarily inconsistent with a State’s decision to 
change its hearsay rules.”111 
Prior to this holding, not all hearsay required confrontation, and “the limits 
of this hearsay exception have simply been defined [not by common law, but] by 
the Court in the exercise of its rule-making power in the area of the federal law 
                                                        
99  See generally Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (plurality opinion). 
100  Id. at 76. 
101  Id. at 77. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. at 81. 
105  Id. at 78 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954)). 
106  Id. at 80. 
107  Id. at 83. 
108  Id. at 81 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970)). 
109  See generally id. 
110  Id. at 95 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
111  Id. at 81 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 155) (plurality opinion). 
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of evidence.”112 But, the Evans decision was only a plurality.113 Ten years later, 
a majority of the Court would develop a working rule on hearsay and confronta-
tion. 
C.   The Roberts Rule (Evidentiary Inquiry) 
In Ohio v. Roberts, the defendant objected to the use of a witness’s prelimi-
nary hearing transcript in lieu of live testimony, claiming that such use violated 
his right to confrontation.114 The prosecution claimed that the witness could not 
be found, despite best efforts to locate her.115 Therefore, the unavailability of the 
witness created an exception to hearsay that allowed the use of prior testimony.116 
In finding that the transcript was admissible and not a violation of confron-
tation, the Supreme Court developed a two-prong test.117 But before the test could 
be applied, the Court also developed a “necessity requirement,” which obliged 
the prosecution either to produce the declarant or to prove his unavailability.118 
This requirement was intriguing because, despite the Dutton court’s insistence 
that history provided no guide to the understanding of constitutional confronta-
tion, the Roberts court cites this necessity requirement as “conform[ing] with the 
Framers’ preference for face-to-face accusation.”119 
After meeting this threshold requirement, the first prong of the test consid-
ered whether the hearsay statement fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion.”120 Despite the Roberts court turning to the Framers’ intent in establishing 
availability, nowhere does the Court turn to history to describe what a “firmly 
rooted hearsay exception” is. No attempt is given to define this term, nor are any 
examples given. The Court’s silence, particularly its failure to describe or find 
the specific historical context for a firmly rooted exception—such as not finding 
that it relates to common law exceptions—may be taken as a tacit approval of 
the holding in Dutton where it stated that the common law is not the source of 
the Confrontation Clause. 
The second prong of the test similarly lacks a clear definition. If the hearsay 
does not fall within a prong-one exception, then the statement still might be ad-
missible if it bears a “particularized guarantee[] of trustworthiness.”121 Footnote 
                                                        
112  Id. at 82. 
113  Justice Stewart authored the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Berger, and Justices White 
and Blackmun. Id. at 76. Justice Marshall authored the dissent, joined by Justices Black, Doug-
las, and Brennan. Id. at 100. It was Justice Harlan who wrote the opinion, concurring in result 
only, that makes this a plurality opinion. Id. at 93. 
114  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 59 (1980). 
115  Id. at 56. 
116  Id. at 56–57. 
117  Id. at 66. 
118  Id. at 65. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. at 66. 
121  Id. 
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nine of the Roberts opinion notes “[t]he complexity of reconciling the Confron-
tation Clause and the hearsay rules.”122 It further notes that scholarly commentary 
agrees there can be no one bright-line rule to determine if hearsay is admissi-
ble.123 Despite this obvious truth, this prong of the Roberts test leaves total dis-
cretion in assessing reliability in the hands of the justices, with only vague terms 
as guidance. 
D.   Moving Away from Roberts (Administrative Ease) 
The Roberts rule expanded beyond all previous tradition and practice of both 
hearsay and confrontation. Born of the criminal procedure staples of assistance 
of counsel and cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause under the Roberts 
test becomes a simple evidentiary inquiry. Natural right of the accused had no 
place in these modern opinions. Two subsequent cases would demonstrate how 
far-reaching this test became. 
In United States v. Inadi, the Court admitted a co-conspirator’s hearsay state-
ment despite the fact that he was available to testify.124 Responding to the so-
called departure from the Roberts necessity rule, the Supreme Court turned the 
question back on the scoffers, claiming it was a “radical proposition that no out-
of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that 
the declarant is unavailable.”125 This cavalier response prompted a harsh dissent 
by Justice Marshall. The fact that the prosecution was not required to make even 
the slightest effort to produce the declarant flew in the face of the “Framers’ 
preference for face-to-face accusation,” denoting a clear violation of the Con-
frontation Clause.126 And yet again, another bold holding, here stating that prov-
ing unavailability is a radical claim, is made largely without justification. 
Shortly after Inadi, the Court delivered the final blow. In White v. Illinois, 
the defendant was charged with sexual assault of a minor.127 Rather than put the 
child on the witness stand, the prosecution presented five witnesses in whom the 
child had confided the abuse, including a family friend, a police officer, and med-
ical personnel.128 White objected on confrontation grounds, claiming the prose-
cution needed to prove unavailability vis-à-vis Roberts.129 The Court held that 
                                                        
122  Id. at 66 n.9. 
123  See id. at 67. 
124  United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
125  Id. at 394. 
126  Id. at 401–02 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
127  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 349 (1992). 
128  See id. at 349–50. 
129  Id. at 351. 
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the statements fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule—a spon-
taneous declaration and statement made pursuant to medical treatment.130 Be-
cause the statements fell under such an exception, the necessity clause was, by 
default, satisfied, with no need to prove unavailability.131 
The Court’s outright rejection of the Roberts necessity requirement was not 
surprising, given the holding in Inadi. The surprise lay in the fact that the Court, 
perhaps for the first time, provided a clear justification for doing so. Justice 
White’s opinion pointed not to any historical practice, nor any analysis of con-
stitutional text, nor to any claim of natural right, but to practicality.132 The Court 
explained that an unavailability rule was “[not] likely to produce . . . [meaning-
ful] testimony” and that it would “impose substantial additional burdens on the 
factfinding process.”133 
In short, Roberts and its progeny restricted the constitutional right to con-
frontation based on administrative ease and cost burden considerations. While 
colonial history and early court cases give little sure guidance on the justification 
for the Confrontation Clause, the holding in Roberts clearly shows that lofty prin-
ciples such as the rights of the accused have little place in the analysis. Rather, 
practical concerns, based on nothing but the court’s discretion, win the day. 
E.   Roberts Overturned (Crawford Rule) 
 In 2004, defendant Michael Crawford was convicted for assault of Kenneth 
Lee.134 Crawford and his wife Sylvia confronted Lee regarding a previous occa-
sion where Lee allegedly attempted to rape Sylvia.135 A fight ensued and Craw-
ford stabbed Lee in the torso.136 During police interrogation, Crawford’s and Syl-
via’s accounts of the stabbing differed as to whether Lee was armed and at what 
point Lee reached for a weapon.137 Sylvia recounted that Lee grabbed for a po-
tential weapon after being stabbed, which if true, would destroy Crawford’s self-
defense claim.138 
 Sylvia did not testify at trial because of a state marital-privilege law that 
barred spousal testimony without the consent of the other spouse.139 Instead, the 
prosecution presented Sylvia’s taped interrogation wherein she stated that Lee 
was unarmed at the time of the stabbing, and may have grabbed for a weapon 
only after the stabbing.140 The lower court convicted Crawford, but the appellate 
                                                        
130  Id. at 356–57. 
131  Id. 
132  See id. at 354–55. 
133  Id. 
134  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. at 39. 
138  See id. at 39–41. 
139  Id. at 40. 
140  Id. at 40–41. 
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court reversed.141 The courts reached opposite conclusions on whether the facts 
showed that Sylvia’s testimony demonstrated any particular “guarantees of trust-
worthiness,” as required under the second prong of the Roberts test.142 
 In a unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court found that the Roberts 
test had strayed from historical confrontation principles.143 Rather, history 
showed that the Confrontation Clause had two particular aims: ex-parte testi-
mony and testimonial hearsay.144 Justice Scalia’s appeal to ex-parte testimony is 
familiar. It recalls Raleigh’s trial and abuses by the Star Chamber, and it was 
perhaps the impetus behind Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in the Aaron Burr 
treason case.145 Ex-parte testimony has a clear historical background in regard to 
confrontation, and it is true that the Roberts decision completely strayed from 
considering this point. 
 Testimonial hearsay, however, is less familiar. Focusing acutely on the con-
stitutional text, Justice Scalia noted that the Confrontation Clause applies to “wit-
nesses” against the accused.146 Using an appropriately aged dictionary (from 
1828), Justice Scalia defined witness as “those who bear testimony.”147 He then 
further defined “testimony” as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for 
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”148 Therefore, as defined by the 
Constitution itself, the Confrontation Clause is concerned at its core with testi-
monial statements. 
 Unfortunately, the Court opted to leave a comprehensive definition of testi-
monial hearsay for another day, though some guidance was given.149 Testimonial 
statements are more like formal statements made to government officers, and less 
like casual remarks made to acquaintances.150 In other words, testimonial state-
ments are those made when the declarant is likely to know that his words can be 
used in court to determine guilt, and nontestimonial statements are those made 
just in passing and with no particular purpose. On this, the Crawford court agreed 
with one aspect first considered in Dutton and later announced in Roberts: not 
every hearsay statement requires confrontation.151 
 Crawford did indeed return the Confrontation Clause to its historical princi-
ples in many ways. Roberts and the subsequent cases became too embroiled in 
weighing exceptions and laws of evidence, and left too much discretion, based 
                                                        
141  Id. at 41. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. at 42. 
144  See id. at 50–51, 53–54. 
145  See id. at 44; see also id. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
146  Id. at 51 (Scalia, C.J., majority). 
147  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
148  Id. 
149  Id. at 68. 
150  Id. at 51. 
151  Alexandra A.E. Shapiro & Noreen A. Kelly-Najah, Supreme Court Breathes New Life into 
the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington, 19 NO. 1 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 
2, 4 (2004). 
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on “amorphous notions of reliability,” for the court to reach its conclusion.152 
Crawford, alternatively, notes that “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to 
satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: 
confrontation.”153 In other words, the rule in Roberts would ask first: “Is this 
testimony reliable?” Whereas, the rule in Crawford correctly redirects the in-
quiry to: “Does this deserve confrontation?” 
 But, the claims of Crawford’s holding that, (1) “testimonial hearsay” is his-
torical, and (2) that it is less discretionary than Roberts, are both mistaken. The 
Crawford holding is therefore paradoxical; it uses historical means to bring about 
a historical understanding. Despite the base intuitive sense that Justice Scalia’s 
textual analysis makes, his claim that the dichotomy of testimonial and nontesti-
monial hearsay is historical is, at best, a stretch of the imagination, and, at worst, 
is completely fabricated. Other than the clever dictionary dance Justice Scalia 
performs, there is no historical record that the Framers viewed things in this light, 
no court case deals with hearsay in any way similar to this, and nothing in the 
common law resembles such an understanding. 
 Claiming that testimonial hearsay is historical is essentially harmless and 
can therefore be forgiven. But the effect of the testimonial hearsay framework—
which subsequent cases have declared as discretionary as the Roberts test—is 
not harmless. Davis v. Washington was the first case to expand upon the testimo-
nial hearsay test.154 The Court’s holding did little more than show how fluid and 
discretionary testimonial statements are. Two domestic violence cases were con-
solidated for the Court’s consideration, and the holding was that statements from 
police interrogations could be both testimonial and nontestimonial.155 The hinge 
upon which the out-of-court statement hangs is the primary purpose of the state-
ment—whether it is a call for aid during a threatening situation or during an on-
going emergency, versus a retelling of a past event.156 
Expanding on this, the holding in Michigan v. Bryant greatly multiplied the 
number of factors for consideration in order to determine if a situation is still 
threatening or an emergency still ongoing.157 Additionally, Bryant also expanded 
the inquiry of the primary purpose of the statement to include the interrogator as 
well as the declarant.158 Seemingly, the Crawford test now requires consideration 
of multiple factors and multiple actors, all with mixed motives and differing 
viewpoints, within a dynamic context. This multiplicity of factors is beginning 
to resemble the wide discretion given under the Roberts test. 
 
                                                        
152  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (internal quotations omitted). 
153  Id. at 69. 
154  See generally Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
155  Id. at 832. 
156  Id. at 830–32. 
157  Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 345–46 (2011). 
158  Id. at 367. 
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F.   Crawford Test in Domestic Violence Cases (Trying to Define 
“Testimonial”) 
 Domestic violence cases since Crawford have established at least three con-
sistent trends in determining whether a statement is testimonial or not. In a Min-
nesota case, police responded to a 911 call where the victim stated, “My boy-
friend just beat me up.”159 When the police began to investigate, the victim first 
described the most recent incident, and then she began to describe events from 
earlier that day.160 The state claimed the statements were considered excited ut-
terances and should be held as nontestimonial.161 In contrast, when Indiana police 
responded to a domestic disturbance report, the scene was calm and the reluctant 
victim only recounted the abuse that occurred after repeated prompting from the 
officer.162 These statements were considered testimonial because they were given 
to prove past events rather than to respond to an emergency.163 The takeaway is 
that nontestimonial statements become testimonial the further they move away 
from the current emergency. 
 Statements made while an assault is in progress are typically nontestimo-
nial.164 Statements made to a police officer who arrived ten to fifteen minutes 
after the 911 call have also been found nontestimonial.165 Conversely, statements 
given to police at a domestic violence scene more than two hours after the inci-
dent were considered testimonial.166 The takeaway here is that the greater the 
time between the incident and the response by authorities, the more likely the 
statements will be considered as proving past events, having been made with 
reflection and deliberation, and are, therefore, testimonial. 
 The person who reports the domestic violence is also a factor in considering 
whether the statements are testimonial.167 In California, a neighbor took in the 
survivor of a recent beating and immediately called the police.168 Because the 
survivor did not reach out personally to the police, but they came looking for her, 
the question was raised whether her interrogation would be considered testimo-
nial.169 She reluctantly testified, after a long period of being unavailable, which 
rendered the question moot.170 The California court, however, seemed open to 
labeling her statements as testimonial—despite the fact that police responded 
shortly after the incident, and she spoke only with regard to the current beating—
                                                        
159  State v. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
160  Id. 
161  Id. at 307–08. 
162  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2006). 
163  Id. at 830. 
164  Marquardt v. State, 882 A.2d 900, 917–18 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). 
165  Vinson v. State, 221 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
166  See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. 
167  See People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
168  People v. Hunter, No. A104022, 2004 WL 1282842, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 9, 2004). 
169  Id. 
170  Id. at *2. 
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simply because she was not the one who reached out to the authorities.171 Con-
versely, in another case where the prosecution submitted a survivor’s police 
statement because she refused to testify, the court held the statement as testimo-
nial because she had initiated the police contact.172 The takeaway is that survi-
vors’ statements to police are more likely to be nontestimonial if they initiate 
police intervention. 
 These trends are troubling. Often, it is difficult to get a domestic violence 
survivor to open up about the abuse, but sometimes, once the floodgates open, 
everything comes pouring out. In the event that a survivor begins to open up to 
a police officer about a recent incident and then reveals information about past 
events, it is unfortunate that the current Crawford trend will penalize the survivor 
for this and hold these statements are testimonial. In such cases, statements about 
current events should be considered nontestimonial while the past events should 
be considered testimonial. Such bifurcation, however, hinges upon a fine line of 
whether the police officer is interrogating to offer police assistance for an ongo-
ing emergency, or simply trying to establish the facts of past events.173 
 The lapse of time between an incident and arrival of authorities presents a 
similar difficulty. It is hard enough for a survivor to make the call for help in the 
first place. Often the survivor’s well-being, or a desire to have the abuser ar-
rested, is not the first concern after an incident of abuse. There is often greater 
concern for the needs of children or other loved ones. Numerous valid reasons 
exist to explain why a survivor does not pick up the phone to dial 911 the minute 
the beating stops, or why a neighbor phones the police instead of the survivor. 
The primary purpose of police responding to a domestic violence call should 
always be considered to determine if an emergency is ongoing, whether phoned 
in by a concerned neighbor or an involved party. 
III.   THE FUTURE OF CRAWFORD AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE–NOT IN AB 193 
 In the larger scheme of domestic violence, the Confrontation Clause does 
not affect a significant number of cases.174 A review of cases that raise confron-
tation issues shows that a majority concern drug charges, larceny allegations, and 
white-collar crimes.175 Domestic violence makes up a small percentage of such 
cases, which begs the question: When the Confrontation Clause seemingly af-
fects so few domestic violence cases, why do states feel the need to enact legis-
lation like AB 193? 
                                                        
171  Id. 
172  Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 776. 
173  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
174  See generally James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause—Supreme Court Cases, 83 A.L.R. FED. 2d 385 (2014). 
175  Id. 
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 The largest problem with domestic violence is reporting. Estimates are that 
a little over 50 percent of domestic violence incidents are reported.176 As noted 
in the Introduction, numerous reasons may make a victim reluctant to bring for-
ward a domestic violence case: fear of further violence for reporting, worry about 
loss of economic support, cultural pressure to remain with the abuser, lack of 
places to go, concern for the safety of children, and feelings of obligation and 
love for the abuser.177 Often, just being back in the presence of the abuser is 
enough to overwhelm and petrify survivors, causing them to relive the abuse.178 
It is this last, narrow concern that AB 193 hopes to address. 
 But AB 193 will not address this concern. A common judicial trend already 
allows hearsay in preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings because con-
frontation is “basically a trial right.”179 It is for this reason that Judge Melissa 
Saragosa, writing on behalf of the justices of the peace for the Eighth Judicial 
District, stated the court’s neutrality with respect to the passage of AB 193, call-
ing it a policy decision for the legislature to make.180 While some saw AB 193 as 
a symbol demonstrating the state’s commitment to holding domestic violence 
abusers accountable, others worried about moving too fast. Supporters of the bill 
focused on how AB 193 would combat violent crime, whereas opponents feared 
this would lead to a vote based on emotion, and wanted more information on how 
the thirty-six other states implemented their respective bills first.181 But at the 
end of the day, supports had nothing to lose in voting for the bill, while those 
opposed faced the potential political threat of being maligned as misogynistic or 
tolerant of child abuse. 
 Moreover, AB 193 does nothing to alleviate a victim’s fear of facing an 
abuser in court because the bill does not permit hearsay or suspend confrontation 
in the actual criminal trial. Of the approximately 23,000 felony cases in Clark 
County last year, only 149 went to trial.182 That means that 99.35 percent of all 
criminal cases settle before actually going to trial. Regarding confrontation, a 
preliminary hearing is overwhelmingly often the only time the accused will have 
a meaningful opportunity to confront his accusers. If the Confrontation Clause is 
                                                        
176  Casey Leins, Sobering Stats for Domestic Violence Awareness Month, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 9, 
2015, 1:01 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/10/09/sobering-stats-
for-domestic-violence-awareness-month [https://perma.cc/RC48-FYHY]. 
177  Byers, supra note 7, at 557. 
178  NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TRAUMA & MENTAL HEALTH, PREPARING FOR COURT 
PROCEEDINGS WITH SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 (2013). 
179  Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). 
180  Letter from Judge Melissa A. Saragosa, Chair of the Legislative Comm. for the Las Vegas 
Justice Court, to Assemblyman Ira Hansen, Chair of the Nev. Assembly Comm. on Judiciary 
(Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/78th2015/ExhibitDocument/ 
OpenExhibitDocument?exhibitId=12831&fileDownloadName=AB%20193%20Position% 
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to have anything to do with its historical goals—disdain for ex-parte testimony, 
concern for excessive judicial overstep, praise for the jury process, and confi-
dence that cross-examination is the key to the adversarial process and is most 
likely to lead to truth—then confrontation should not just be limited to a trial. 
Rather, it must be permitted through every stage of the criminal proceeding. 
 This is especially true because Nevada is one of eighteen states that either 
prohibit hearsay at preliminary hearings, or only allow it through limited excep-
tions.183 A stringent adherence to trial rules during a probable cause determina-
tion ensures a fair hearing for the defendant. To require such stringency in all 
other aspects of a preliminary hearing, only to carve out a small exception under 
AB 193, goes against the policy reasons for enforcing the rules of evidence dur-
ing those early stages. 
 The current Crawford test has at least moved away from the practicality con-
cerns of the Roberts test, and does indeed rest more on the historical principle of 
disdain for ex-parte statements. But the arbitrariness of having to define state-
ments as testimonial or nontestimonial has completely obliterated consideration 
for the other historical principles, particularly the strong desire for effective crim-
inal rights. Therefore, AB 193 may fit within the letter of the Constitution, but 
moves far away from its spirit and historical intent. 
 Further, legislators misunderstand the context of confrontation in a domes-
tic-violence setting. The problem is not the constitutional understanding, but of 
simply having the courage to stand up and say no to the abuse, and accessing the 
needed support to safely leave the situation in the first place. AB 193 does noth-
ing to support a survivor in this aspect. Further, AB 193 does nothing to help the 
underreporting of domestic violence. Supporters of the bill argue that not having 
to face the abuser during the early criminal proceedings creates an impetus to file 
a charge, but that notion is shortsighted.184 
 Suppose a survivor files a charge, does not appear at the preliminary hearing, 
and the police report read by the prosecutor is sufficient to find probable cause 
to go to trial. In this scenario, the defense has no opportunity to question the 
testimony of the accuser. In other words, the defense is denied the opportunity to 
test how strong the prosecution’s case is. This is a disincentive to settle, meaning 
more cases will go to trial. And with more cases going to trial, the very problem 
that AB 193 was intended to prevent occurs: the fear and trauma that confronts 
the survivor when re-facing the abuser. But in this scenario, with the Sixth 
Amendment constitutional protections of confrontation of witnesses in a criminal 
trial in place, the survivor must confront the abuser. There is no escaping it at 
trial. Therefore, AB 193 is ineffective. 
 Legislators should focus their attention not on the constitutional definition 
of confrontation, but on the colloquial, everyday understanding of confrontation 
                                                        
183  Hearing on A.B. 193 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, supra note 3, at 24 (testi-
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in order to foster strength and courage in the survivor to say “no” to the abuse, 
and to have effective means to escape the abuse safely. The best way to do that 
is to provide more and better means of support: shelter for survivors and their 
children, child care facilities to allow the survivor to go to work, meaningful 
protection orders that ensure the abuser stays away, advocacy programs that sup-
port the survivor during the trial phase, and emotional counseling for the survivor 
to overcome the effects of the abuse. 
Additionally, stiffer criminal procedures will do nothing to deter the occur-
rence of domestic violence. An abuser is unlikely to stop the abuse out of fear 
that he will not be able to exercise his constitutional right to confront his victim 
during the pre-trial stages. While counseling for abusers has historically done 
little to reduce recidivism rates, it is still the most humane course. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to confrontation has a historical purpose to protect the rights of 
accused criminals, especially against ex-parte communications, and is tied 
closely to the other bedrock principles of our modern court system today, 
namely: the adversarial process, representation of the accused by counsel, and a 
trial by jury of one’s peers. The Sixth Amendment focuses on criminal rights, 
and while today there may be little reason to simply appeal to natural right as 
justification for providing the accused the right to confront their accusers, the 
historical abuses that arose from not doing so are clear examples why face-to-
face confrontation should always be preferred. While trying to alleviate the fears 
and pressures a domestic violence survivor experiences during court proceedings 
is laudable, laws like AB 193 do more to whittle away at what the Constitution 
aims to protect than to help those survivors. AB 193 focuses only on a small 
branch of the domestic violence tree, and is ineffective against any root cause. 
Additionally, AB 193, though technically permissible under current confronta-
tion jurisprudence, tramples underfoot the spirit of confrontation. 
 Legislative attention should focus more on providing means to protect and 
secure domestic abuse survivors before they enter the court system. Domestic 
violence may be one of the oldest, most recurrent, and most underreported of-
fenses of all time. This sad history may mean there is little that can be done to 
prevent it. Efforts should therefore focus on providing means to escape, having 
places of refuge for both survivor and children, creating resources to help eco-
nomically, and offering the counseling needed to emotionally overcome the 
abuse. AB 193 is an ineffective piece of legislation, and it should not be allowed 
to risk the integrity of an essential constitutional guarantee. 
